Db2 Security Best Practices Staying up with the threats

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- Member of the inaugural IBM Db2 Information Champions
- One of 40 IBM Db2 Gold Consultant Worldwide
- President of DAMA-NCR
- Past President of International Db2 Users Group IDUG
- Best speaker at CMG conference & former TDWI instructor
- Former Co-Author of certification tests
 - Db2 DBA Certification tests
 - IBM Business Intelligence certification test
- Former Columnist for IBM Data Management Magazine

Extensive experience in Big Data systems, DW design and performance

- Working with Db2 on z/OS since V1.2
- Working with Db2 on LUW since OS/2 Extended Edition
- Designed/implemented first data warehouse in 1988 for E.F. Hutton
- Syspedia for data lineage and data dependencies since 2001
 - Find, understand and integrate your data faster!

Consulting

- Security Audit & Compliance
- Db2 Performance Review
- CPU MLC Demand Reduction
- Analytics & Database Design Review
- Db2 12 Migration Assistance
- Java Application Performance Tuning

Educational Seminars

- Java Security for Application Developers
- Db2 Version 12 Transition
- Db2 Performance for Java Developers
- Data Analytics Designs for Performance
- How to Do a Java Performance Review

Proven Performance Tips: www.DaveBeulke.com

Security is only as good as the weakest link in the chain

- Database security depends on many supporting technologies:
 - The host operating system(s) provides protection of the database, its configuration and data.
 - The networks provides protections via network devices and applications.
 - Cloud, Web and application servers provide the security framework for all the cloud interfaces, hosted web applications;
 - Connected world-These servers control access to other servers and applications that control others etc..
 - Everything is connected in the architecture of RESTful Services
 - The applications provides access to the data. If the application does not contribute to the security model, it can provide fully-privileged, un-audited access to the database and any data it connects to.

DBAs are blamed for everything

- Goes beyond a single operating system
 - System administrators SYSADMs, SECADMs
 - DBAs DBADMs
 - Operators SYSOPR
- Goes beyond a single application
 - So many processes
 - Variety of programming languages new open source languages are full of holes
 - How many levels of authorized application does your company have?

Welcome to the matrix of security complexity

Thousands/millions of security situations



Technology updates are most important security factor!

- Evaluate the technology and security factors of Db2 z/OS applications accessing it!
 - Vendor viability
 - Version overall age
 - Patch level
 - Patch frequency
 - Open source support contract
- Early identification of the security vulnerability and misconfigurations
- Evaluate and audit any shared security services and/or controls

Understand entire stack security requirements and technology capabilities

According to Gartner 99% of hacks are because of outdated technology

According to IBM, Crowdstrike and Akamai

- Number of threats continue to raise
 - Types of threats are getting more complex
 - Most hacks are because of somebody's actions or lack of actions
 - <u>https://www.ibm.com/security/digital-assets/xforce-threat-intelligence-index-map/</u>
 - <u>https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/2020-crowdstrike-global-threat-report/</u>
 - IBM X-report (including publicly accessible cloud storage, unsecured cloud databases, and improperly secured rsync backups, or open internet connected network area storage devices) accounted for 86 percent of the records compromised in 2019
 - <u>https://threatpost.com/poorly-secured-docker-image-rapid-attack/154874/</u>
 - https://threatpost.com/70-of-apps-open-source-bugs/156040/ 70 Percent of Mobile, Desktop Apps Contain Open-Source Bugs
 - <u>https://blogs.akamai.com/sitr/2020/04/a-brief-history-of-a-rootable-docker-image.html</u>

How many virtual or direct connections

Understand TCP/IP - DVIPA/VIPA settings

- How different is Production versus Test?
 - Any Defaults used?
- Sysplex dynamic routing turned on? To how many members?
- Capturing transaction profiles?
 - Who can trace in production?





Check your settings!

Examine the

- **IPLIST**
- IPNAMES
- LOCATIONS
- LULIST

DBAs collaborate with everyone-start security documentation

- Start setting security expectations during development
 - Application technology base inventory
 - Risk profile of technology <u>version</u> and <u>patch history</u>
- Document system's important data and its security
 - GDPR, PII profile requirements/exposure
 - Application Interface inventory
 - Document all application sensitive, proprietary, HIPAA, GDPR, PII data
 - Security usage profiles unique and shared with other applications
 - Document all interfaces, services and shared application access points
- Socialize, document and audit the important security aspects:
 - Systems architecture cloud, hybrid, HTAP, outsourced, cross-platform, database operational profile
 - Work with installer, configuration review for security definitions and interfaces handling for PII, HIPAA, GDPR data
 - Document all the interfaces available to any application, user, administrator, vendor and operations
 - Start with the interfaces to the important data

Danger increases!

Average probability is 27.7% that organizations in the study will have a data breach in the next 2 years.

Last year, the average probability was only 25.6%!

Standard protocol for connections

- Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS-140 2)
 - DB2 z/OS still the leader implemented with TLS in DB2 z/OS
 - Government standard for secure interaction
 - TLS SSL client/server cryptographic protocol
 - Redpaper Configuring TLS/SSL Secure Client/Server Communications <u>www.redbooks.ibm.com/redpapers/pdfs/redp4799.pdf</u>
 - Should be used for all your connections for CICS and DB2 applications
- Implement IP filtering
 - Monitor report rogue access
- Policy base Traffic IP Routing
 - Do not allow any out of pattern access
- SSL is not secure must be using TLS!



Chris Meyer Paolo Bruni

DB2 for z/OS: Configuring TLS/SSL for Secure Client/Server Communications

BoD @ CEO @ CISO @ CDO @ DBA - Cycle of engagement

- Document security baseline of legacy applications first and evaluate security of new architectures and applications
- Evaluation of the entire technology stack is the key to determining your security exposures
- Scheduling yearly/regular security audits, drives the information baseline for security for upper management evaluation
- Documentation to cover your security procedures?
- What security audit tasks are included in normal DBA activities or application maintenance schedules?



Establish data management security inventories

- Establish DBA Security documentation
 - 48% of companies do not regularly report on security
 - Have a plan of protection to detect, protect and react
 - Begin to develop cyber breach response plan (CBRP)
- Understand your legal liabilities of a data breach
 - Ready GDPR=\$,\$\$\$,\$\$\$ -Good for budget allocation
- Inventory all hard and soft targets
 - Talent, audit security tools, PII data, home grown or packaged software etc.
- Need to raise the DBA profile of security awareness and document security audit interactions
 - Drive the process or be driven by the security issues your choice

Raise the profile of the security evaluation work for everyone especially the Board of Directors
Start a commitment of reporting on security bi-weekly/monthly/yearly basis



Know your levels of monitoring

- Best practices for systems
 - Multi-layered protection
 - Multi-Tiered system access inventoried
 - Multiple logon authentication 2-factor authorization
 - Almost all trusted devices and clients (>99%)
 - Monitoring Tools standard for PII HIPAA
 - Known active security lifecycle procedures
 - Active lifecycle security system & application audits
- System and Application testing techniques
 - Security & configurations <u>standardized</u>
 - UNIX & z/OS
 - Cross platform monitoring/auditing tools utilized
 - Automated Security breach response/tools
 - z/OS RACF 3-strikes
 - UNIX Security automation, logging and response



Assess and tighten production testing security perimeter

- Storage/Data pools used within the different environments
 - Understand your storage configuration to realize shared device exposures
 - Make sure the DS8800 Encryption license is purchased with the hardware
 - Map out the channel connections used within your environment
 - Verify the security ids that have access to your Db2 databases and their HLQs
 - Not just Db2 ids but also all the systems, storage and operations user ids with access to those storage pools
 - <u>Encrypt</u> *αll* data at rest!

Security ids

- Where in your systems or connections can your user id be changed into another id?
- What services or operational authorities are there over your Db2 systems, applications or tools?
- Where are individual ids still used within your system? Every access should be a ROLE!

Encrypt database data at design development time

- Verify encryption used within your databases if possible
 - Encryption protects data at rest
 - Make sure to use DB2 built in facilities for disk encryption
 - DS8800 Encryption licenses purchased for full coverage
- DB2 z/OS can requires an encryption password and hint
 - if desired, an associated hint can be specified
 - the DECRYPT_BIT, DECRYPT_CHAR, DECRYPT_DB functions
 - When SQL passes the password DB2 provides decrypted data

SET ENCRYPTION PASSWORD ='BEULKE2020'; INSERT INTO CUST1(SSN) VALUES ENCRYPT_TDES('123-45-6789'); SELECT DECRYPT_CHAR(SSN) FROM EMP;

Security practices for Db2 database definition

- Best practices for databases
 - Broad encryption type protection
 - Data at rest storage encryption key store protection
 - Design your database with steganography features
 - Table splits/naming
 - Column splits/naming
 - Data Procedures secured for data access

Design/improve with GDPR, PII and HIPAA granular security layer

- Table special auditing
- Columnar security
- Element access control
- Column masking/encryption
- Column Obfuscation

Verify trusted and encrypted communication everywhere your system can control!

Steganography

Steganography – Obscure to secure

- Introduce to the "SALT and PEPPER" your data concepts
- No changes to database SSN 9 digits
- Example SSN is `123456789'

CREATE TABLE	BEULKE.CUST1 (
FIRST_NAME	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
LAST_NAME	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
ADDRESS1	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
ADDRESS2	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
CITY	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
STATE_CD	CHAR (2)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
ZIPCODE	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
PHONE	DECIMAL (10,0)	NOT NULL DEFAULT 9999999999,
SSN	DECIMAL (9,0)	NOT NULL DEFAULT 99999999999,
CC NBR	DECIMAL (16,0)	NOT NULL DEFAULT 999999999999999999999
CCEXP	DECIMAL (4,0)	NOT NULL DEFAULT 9999,
CCSCD	DECIMAL (3,0)	NOT NULL DEFAULT 999
DEAT CON - 1	23456789 and quate	mor with FIPST NAME - \John/ - J

• SALT and Pepper is data shift!

Steganography

- So data shift of five positions based on first name
 - INSERT '678912345' into SSN since FIRST_NAME = "John" J
- Application knows the data shift

CREATE TABLE	BEULKE.CUST1 (
FIRST_NAME	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
LAST_NAME	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
ADDRESS1	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
ADDRESS2	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
CITY	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
STATE_CD	CHAR (2)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
ZIPCODE	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
PHONE	DECIMAL (10,0)	NOT NULL DEFAULT 9999999999,
SSN	DECIMAL (9,0)	NOT NULL DEFAULT 99999999999
CC NBR	DECIMAL (16,0)	NOT NULL DEFAULT 99999999999999999
CCEXP	DECIMAL (4,0)	NOT NULL DEFAULT 9999,
CCSCD	DECIMAL (3,0)	NOT NULL DEFAULT 999
1	00456500 1	

REAL SSN = 123456789 and customer with FIRST_NAME = 'John' - J

• SALT and Pepper is data shift!

dave @ d a v e b e u l k e. c o m

Steganography – New system secured

- Example #2 Add more factors to hide your data
- Hide in plain sight
- Hashing, encoding, adding digit or values

CREATE TABLE	BEULKE.CUST1 (
FIRST NAME	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
LAST_NAME	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
ADDRESS1	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
ADDRESS2	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
CITY	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
STATE_CD	CHAR (2)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
ZIPCODE	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
PHONE	DECIMAL (10,0)	NOT NULL DEFAULT 9999999999,
SSN	DECIMAL (11,0)	NOT NULL DEFAULT 99999999999,
CC_NBR	DECIMAL (16,0)	NOT NULL DEFAULT 9999999999999999,
CC_EXP	DECIMAL (4,0)	NOT NULL DEFAULT 9999,
CC_SCD	DECIMAL (3,0)	NOT NULL DEFAULT 999
REAL SSN = 12	23456789	

• Two bytes of overhead - SSN defined as 11 bytes

Steganography

- "SALT and PEPPER" your data
- Padded with an extra 4th & 6th digits before and after the real SSN
- So INSERT **'41234567896**' into 11 digit

CREATE TABLE	BEULKE.CUST1 (
FIRST NAME	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
LAST NAME	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
ADDRESS1	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
ADDRESS2	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
CITY	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
STATE_CD	CHAR (2)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
ZIPCODE	CHAR (25)	NOT NULL DEFAULT ' ',
PHONE	DECIMAL (10,0)	NOT NULL DEFAULT 9999999999,
SSN	DECIMAL (11,0)	NOT NULL DEFAULT 99999999999,
CC NBR	DECIMAL (16,0)	NOT NULL DEFAULT 9999999999999999,
CCEXP	DECIMAL (4,0)	NOT NULL DEFAULT 9999,
CC_SCD	DECIMAL (3,0)	NOT NULL DEFAULT 999
REAL SSN = 12	23456789	

• SALT and Pepper the data

Db2 Functionality – Built in Steganography

- Db2 functionality encryption-like along with redefined Columns to different encoding formats
 - SBCS data a single-byte character set representation
 - DBCS data a double-byte character set representation
 - Mixed Data mixture of characters from a single-byte character set (SBCS) and a multiplebyte character set (MBCS)
 - BINARY definition binary strings
 - EBCDIC table can contain one or more Unicode columns
 - Understand the definition and UNICODE usage restrictions
- Row and Column Access Controls RCAC
 - Permissions based on user/values
- Column Masks
 - Column permissions

03003802	996CB7BA	0EG0161B	G0021C06
BA7CE203	G0030200	01208600	37D14D00
1B7125G0	024FG002	53D03C00	AD722500
BD03C00	887525C1	01A07700	37D14D00
B7125G0	024FG002	53D03C00	AD722500
BD03C00	887525C1	47553	53414242
P4F3D41	4242434E	3D4A6	6469204
6C2F4F	553D4553	414	4F3D414
425604	00312230	0424	0003424
003042	400 000	024E4E41	F OOB1D3
2254F1	21 09	8833B0C	C 2957EE
3ECAA	CB3EE8EF	DF038D7	F A14217
2AA4D	04143875	4F571C8	3 535004
DED9 H	357C659E	C820EE0	7 FA49F
96DB 7	D7F743D	9A36DD2	9 454E0
014D 4	10800C8	9A54E01	2 5A140

Physical – Applications

- Hide <u>ALL</u> Technology Versions
- OS, Web Server, TCPIP Address
- Disable Server Directory Listing
- Remove unnecessary server processes
- Separate Security Profile for each component and application

- Limit TimeOut Values keep it low
- Limit # connections
- Limit Keep Alive Timeout minimized
- Limit Request Size -
- Limit Reply size
- Limit # SQL for each connection/TX
- Trusted context connections only
- Remove *.NULLID defaults
- Remove unused programs/classes
- Only approved services/programs
- Log & <u>analyze</u> denied access requests
- Only TLS encrypted access

Framework liability?

- Picture says it all
 - How secure is your framework?
 - How many releases are your applications behind?
 - Java 10 coming which version are you on?
 - Old Spring releases are <u>very</u> vulnerable!



https://www.slideshare.net/kunalashar/the-2014-decision-makers-guide-to-java-web-frameworks

- POJO security is achievable but difficult and needs verification!
 - Also needs to stay up with software fixes

Frameworks can be the most vulnerable and risky

• Framework is only secure if...

- Programming is done with the latest APIs, certificates are used correctly and interfaces security reviewed
- Configurations is confirmed to be configured and controlled properly
- Change control and implementation is secured with good procedures
- Spring can use several configurations to secure the environment
 - Are you using the XML based or Java based Spring security classes, configuration and procedures
 - Have you migrated from the old one to the new one? Did you update the configuration to current conventions?
 - Did you update the interface partner security also?
- HttpSecurity has 10 different methods
 - Are each of your applications set up correctly? Reviewed lately?
 - The security antMatcher("/api/**") needs to be invoked before addFilterAfter(...)
 - So filter is only applied to URLs matching the pattern "/api/**".



Framework in production reviewed/updated lately?

Applications security best practices

- Eliminate or upgraded old software versions
 - Frameworks Spring, Ruby Groovy etc.
 - Old Java and supporting software libraries
 - Especially **Open Source code** with <u>known</u> issues
- Old Application (JUNIT) testing reviews
 - JavaScript security execution
 - XSS Cross-Site Scripting
 - Research app for indirect site references



- All types of **SQL** injection possibilities that need inspection
 - R, Python, JS, XML, SQL, NoSQL, LDAP etc..
 - Everywhere a program passes a value to a program accessing the database

Does each application have a security risk rating?

- Techniques for applications
 - Insufficient logging and monitoring
 - Securing system and application logs and all debugging/audit information
 - Too much access to the logging within all the systems
 - Standard application error handling procedures and practices
 - Coding reviews for standard security techniques and practices
 - Poor connection, trust manager and certificate management controls
 - Architecture for always secure and encrypted communications
 - Stick with reference Java and Cloud architectures
 - Establish application security baseline
 - Establish Security Audit Risk Rating for each application!

7 phases of security

- Security roles, access control, and authentication requirement
 - Authentication is most important and popular of the security aspects



- Problems caused by wrong versions of software libraries and version conflicts between dependent processes
- Always want two factor authentication with user interfaces!

How do applications access

- Governance, Risk and compliance management
- How many levels/categories are in your authorizations?
 - Authorities within or shared across environments
 - Roles
 - Groups
 - User Ids should be avoided and minimized
- Row and Column Access Control RCAC
 - Steganography techniques are built in to your design and Db2
 - Application impact of RCAC controls
 - Guarantees data alignment with RCAC rules
 - Impacts SELECT Result Sets, INSERT/UPDATE/DELETEs because of data RCAC alignment

Research all versions of your software

- Research your framework, application libraries and special situations
 - Older or Community version of JBoss, Spring, etc....
 - IBM/Redhat has its own CVE
- National Vulnerability Database https://nvd.nist.gov/
- NIST is the national standard national crisis
 - Mitre also <u>https://cve.mitre.org/</u> also <u>https://attack.mitre.org/</u>
- Research your exposures and endpoint's status
 - iOS and Android rogue apps
 - Chinese phones send data back
 - Google tracks every Android phone movement!
 - https://qz.com/1131515/google-collects-android-users-locations-even-when-location-services-are-disabled/

Understand your security threat landscape

- Threat scenario for each application?
- Where are your PII data valuables?
- Email exposures
 - Attachment scanning
 - Link validation
 - Email training
- Cloud provider risk
 - Our cloud is move secure than theirs

THE RISKS

How can cybercriminals attack the Internet of Everything?

SNIFFER ATTACKS

An attack which involves a program called a 'sniffer', which sniffs out any unencrypted information being passed through a network and then steals it.

DENIAL OF SERVICE

An attack where cybercriminals prevent or slow down the use of certain networks and/or devices.

COMPROMISED-KEY ATTACKS

An attack where the key to encrypted communications is stolen and is then used to interpret the encrypted data.

PASSWORD-BASED

An attack where cybercriminals break into a network and/or a device connected to a specific network by guessing or stealing its password.

MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE

An attack where a third entity steals the data being transmitted between two parties and/or devices.

Created by TrendLabs Global Technical Support and RED Creater of TREND MICRO

- PUBLIC is not your friend REVOKE
- **1** DB₂ Trusted Communications
- 2 Authorities over/usage privileges
 - Databases, plans, packages, Distinct Types, usage of BPs, SGs & TSs

--- CONTAINS ONE ROW FOR EACH TRUSTED CONTEXT. SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.SYSCONTEXT FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR;

--- CONTAINS ONE ROW FOR EACH TRUSTED CONTEXT. SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.SYSCTXTTRUSTATTRS FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR;

--- ONE ROW FOR EACH AUTHORIZATION -- ID WITH WHICH THE TRUSTED CONTEXT CAN BE USED. SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.SYSCONTEXTAUTHIDS FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR;



Run time executables within your environment

3 AUDIT Policies & Executable modules4 ROLES, Ids

---SECADM -- CONTAINS ONE ROW FOR --- EACH AUDIT POLICY. SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.SYSAUDITPOLICIES FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR;

--- CONTAINS AUDITING OPTION COLUMN --- AUDIT ALL/CHANGE/NONE SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.SYSTABLES FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR;

--- CONTAINS SECURITY DETAILS ON --- SPs, UDFs & CAST FUNCTIONS SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.SYSROUTINEAUTH FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR;

--- CONTAINS EXTERNAL_SECURITY --- COLUMN DB2/SESSION_USER/DEFINER SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.SYSROUTINES FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR; -- THE SYSIBM.SYSROLES TABLE -- CONTAINS ONE ROW FOR EACH ROLE. SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.SYSROLES FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR;

---CONTAINS A ROW FOR EACH PARAMETER -- OF A ROUTINE OR MULTIPLE ROWS FOR ---TABLE PARAMETERS (ONE FOR EACH ---COLUMN OF THE TABLE). --- ROUTINE CAN HAVE A ROLE IN OWNERTYPE SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.SYSPARMS FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR;

-- THE SYSIBM.SYSSCHEMAAUTH TABLE -- CONTAINS ONE OR MORE ROWS FOR EACH -- USER THAT IS GRANTED A PRIVILEGE ON A -- PARTICULAR SCHEMA IN THE DATABASE. SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.SYSSCHEMAAUTH FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR; -- SYSIBM.SYSSEQUENCEAUTH TABLE -- RECORDS THE PRIVILEGES THAT ARE HELD -- BY USERS OVER SEQUENCES SELECT *

FROM SYSIBM.SYSSEQUENCEAUTH FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR;

5 User Ids research

- Understand the extend of the Ids in your system
- Determine risk of each user id
- Begin list to eliminate obsolete ids
- Ids by database and application cross reference

-- THE SYSIBM.SYSUSERAUTH TABLE RECORDS THE -- SYSTEM PRIVILEGES THAT ARE HELD BY USERS SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.SYSUSERAUTH FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR;

-- THE SYSIBM.SYSTABAUTH TABLE RECORDS THE -- PRIVILEGES THAT USERS HOLD ON AND VIEWS SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.SYSTABAUTH FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR;

--- SECADM - ONE ROW FOR EACH ROW PERMISSION --- AND COLUMN MASK SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.SYSCONTROLS FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR; --- LISTS THE DEPENDENT OBJECTS FOR EACH ROLE SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.SYSOBJROLEDEP FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR;

-- THE SYSIBM.SYSCOLAUTH TABLE RECORDS THE -- UPDATE OR REFERENCES PRIVILEGES THAT ARE --- HELD BY USERS ON INDIVIDUAL --- COLUMNS OF A TABLE OR VIEW. SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.SYSCOLAUTH FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR;

6 Understand the connections

- Understand the many connections
 - Determine risk of each connection
 - Minimize TCP/IP connections VIPA/DVIPA

--CONTAINS A ROW FOR EACH IP ADDRESS --THAT CORRESPONDS TO A REMOTE DRDA SERVER SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.IPLIST FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR;

--CONTAINS A ROW FOR EACH REMOTE DRDA SERVER THAT --DB2 CAN ACCESS USING TCP/IP SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.IPNAMES FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR;

--CONTAINS A ROW FOR EVERY ACCESSIBLE --REMOTE SERVER SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.LOCATIONS FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR; --CONTAINS A ROW FOR EACH REAL LU NAME THAT IS --ASSOCIATED WITH THE DUMMY LU NAME FOR A DATA --SHARING GROUP SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.LULIST FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR;

--CONTAINS A ROW FOR THE CONVERSATION LIMIT FOR EACH --COMBINATION OF LU NAME AND VTAM LOGON MODE --DESCRIPTION SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.LUMODES FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR;

--CONTAINS A ROW FOR EACH REMOTE SNA --CLIENT OR SERVER SELECT * FROM SYSIBM.LUNAMES FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR;

--CONTAINS A ROW FOR EACH VTAM LOGON MODE AND --COMBINATION OF AUTHORIZATION ID, PLAN NAME, --AND LU NAME SELECT * FROM SYSIBM. MODESELECT FETCH FIRST 10 ROWS ONLY WITH UR;

Ideas for auditing your environment security

- 1. Tighten up your infrastructure security definitions every year
- 2. Integrate security risk assessments into maintenance and development lifecycle
- 3. Work to eliminate ids access and redefine controls to ROLES/RACF
- 4. Know GDPR, PII, and HIPAA elements, use Db2 facilities and steganography methods to protect them
- 5. Encrypt database, backups, archives any data copies at rest, and all communications to protect and minimize the threats
- 6. Monitor and log ALL activity protect and encrypt all logs!

Get security audit and documentation going today!

DUGVIRTUAL Summer 2020 NA Db2 Tech Conference



Thank you!

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• Take any questions now or email them if you need ideas/support later!

Support IDUG's Virtual Meeting in July - Sign up at IDUG.org